The Soft Center of NATO's Eastern Flank

At the conclusion of a meeting of the Bucharest Nine group in the Romanian capital on May 13, 2026, Czech President, Petr Pavel, declared that “Russia is, and will remain, even after achieving a ceasefire or peace agreement in Ukraine, the main security challenge and threat for Europe for the foreseeable future.” The mid-May gathering in Bucharest included representatives from all members of the group, the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Mark Rutte, leaders from Scandinavia, as well as Ukrainian President Zelensky.

The Bucharest Nine, founded in 2015, represents the eastern flank of NATO and includes every alliance member along that front from Bulgaria in the south to Estonia at the northern terminus. The Czech Republic, while not an eastern flank border state, is also a member. The Bucharest meeting, focused on solidifying support to Kyiv and, in the process strengthening the entire eastern front of the alliance, went virtually unnoticed in the United States and much of Western Europe. Had officials in Washington, London, Paris, and Berlin paid more attention, they would have noticed that the geographic center of NATO’s eastern reaches—specifically Hungary, Slovakia, and Pavel’s own Czech Republic—represents the weak point, both militarily and politically, of the entire 1500 mile border with the ongoing instability of the former Soviet Union.

Highlighting the challenges of this “soft center,” both in the strictly military realm as well as in the wider political sphere in the countries that form the belt buckle of the alliance’s eastern front, will be the focus of this analysis.

By the Numbers

Ascertaining a nation’s military readiness is based on multiple factors to include political will, current capabilities, and level of defense spending. Beginning with the last of these criteria, the three countries at the center of this examination—literally and figuratively—are significantly wanting when compared to their NATO brethren to the north and south. Starting with Hungary, only in 2023 did Budapest reach the two percent of GDP level in defense spending after fifteen years of meagre and flat military budgets. The Hungarian case coincides with the reign of Viktor Orbán, the firebrand populist and self-appointed leader of Central Europe’s anti-Ukraine wing. The April 2026 dethroning of Orbán by opposition politician Péter Magyar will undoubtedly alter the defense dynamic in Budapest but tangible improvements in a country’s military posture take time once a political decision to effect change is made. Consequently, from a strictly military preparedness standpoint, Hungary will remain in the near term a relatively weak link in the alliance’s eastern front.

Moving just north of the Hungarian border, Slovakia’s expenditures in the military realm have mirrored Budapest’s over the past decade with Bratislava reaching the minimally-required two percent of GDP level only in 2025 with roughly the same level projected for 2026. The debate over the appropriate level of funding for the Slovak army has highlighted stark political divisions in the country between the government of Prime Minister Robert Fico—now the most Moscow-friendly leader in Central Europe—and the significant pro-Europe opposition. It is also instructive to note that in Slovakia, as well as in the Czech Republic, some of the recent increases in defense spending stems from infrastructure projects—roads, military hospitals, etc.—that are, at best, tangential to military readiness.

Regarding the Czechs, they are the only country of the three whose defense expenditures for 2026 are regressing, falling under the two percent of GDP target for 2026. According to NATO analysis, Prague, after reaching the two percent of GDP level in 2024 and 2025, will only disburse 1.78 percent of GDP for the military, a drop of nearly .25 percent from the previous year. While the Czechs do not share a border with Ukraine, the backsliding on NATO commitments is significant, given that over the previous four years (2021-2025) Prague represented a core node in NATO’s support to Kyiv. Not surprisingly, the shifting focus away from defense in the Czech Republic coincides with a new government in Prague, the potential ramifications of which will be further addressed below.

As a comparison, defense spending in the northern wing of the eastern flank—Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and now Finland—is north of 2.8 percent of GDP for all of these countries for 2025 with Poland expending well over four percent to lead the way. While it is understandable that these nations with longer and more exposed borders to Russia and Belarus spend more on security, the reticence of the Central European states to sacrifice financially for the collective defense is not likely well received in Warsaw, Helsinki, and the capitals of the Baltic states.

What Each Brings to the Party

The level of budgetary funding for the military is only one measure of a state’s worth to the NATO mission. The manpower each country’s military possesses as well as the unique capabilities each nation brings to the fight is also of critical importance. Regarding the former, each of the three countries of interest in this study maintain considerably fewer men under arms than their immediate neighbors to both the north and the south on NATO’s eastern front. According to recent data published by the New Union Post, the combined manpower strength of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary is approximately 67,000 troops, less than either Romania or Poland brings to the fight.

In terms of military hardware, each of the three countries currently fields, at best, modest ground and air combat capabilities. All three rely heavily on 4th generation fighter airframes with the Czechs and Hungarians dependent on the JAS 39 Gripen while Slovakia is now flying F-16V aircraft. It is important to note, however, that Prague signed a deal in early 2024 to purchase 24 F-35 fighter jets from the United States. The purchase, valued at $6.6 billion and representing the largest single military expenditure in Czech history, will provide Prague with a 5th generation fighter capability once the aircraft become operational in the early 2030s.

Supporting NATO force interoperability, Budapest and Bratislava both host multinational battlegroups for the alliance, joining other eastern flank states in serving as tripwires of any military malfeasance emanating from the east. The battlegroups in both Slovakia and Hungary fall under the control of NATO’s Multinational Division Centre Headquarters in Székesfehérvár, Hungary.

 Spain commands the battlegroup in Slovakia, headquartered in Lešť, to the east of Bratislava. With nearly 800 troopsstationed at the unit, the Spanish lead a NATO force consisting of soldiers from the Czech Republic, Portugal, Slovenia, and the host nation. Meanwhile, in Hungary, NATO has established another battlegroup with hundreds of troops from Croatia, Hungary, and Italy, complemented by reserve forces from Turkey. The unit in Hungary includes both artillery and armored elements, providing a robust reminder of the alliance's commitment to the defense of Central Europe.

Where There’s Ammunition, There’s Influence

Where this region does make a significant contribution to NATO’s collective security, particularly since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, is in the defense industry realm. Both the Czechs and Slovaks, going back to their joint efforts as part of the former Czechoslovakia during the Cold War, have historically been active in producing armaments. Building on this expertise, the Czechs championed an “ammunition initiative” in 2024 to keep Kyiv supplied with artillery shells, small arms ammunition, and other armaments, using mostly Western European financing to purchase the military kit from global suppliers.

While the program is currently facing headwinds due to political reticence and war fatigue, it has provided critical supplies to Ukraine over the past two years. According to December 2025 data from outgoing Czech Premier Petr Fiala, 1.8 million pieces of high-caliber ammunition were sent to Kyiv in 2025 as part of the initiative. Furthermore, the German government in early June of 2026 announced plans to contribute approximately 300 million Euros to the initiative for the purchase of 50,000 pieces of long-range artillery rounds for Ukraine. 

Prague’s importance to Kyiv’s battle with Moscow was highlighted in

April of 2026 when the Russian Defense Ministry threatened military action against a list of European firms purportedly producing drones for Ukraine, two of which are located in the Czech Republic. The Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly chastised the Russian Ambassador in Prague for the threat, much as a previous Czech government in 2021 reprimanded the Kremlin for a sabotage operation it carried out in 2014 against an ammunition warehouse in the village of Vrbětice in eastern Moravia.   

While the Czech munitions initiative has received the bulk of the press, armaments production in both successor states to Czechoslovakia has become a growth industry, in the process contributing to NATO’s material readiness. Starting in Prague, arms industry exports led by the Czechoslovak Group, one of the continent’s largest defense firms, increasednearly seven fold over the first half of the 2020s to over four billion Euro in 2025. Meanwhile, the traditional core of Slovak defense industry centered around the towns of Martin, Trenčin, and Dubnica nad Váhom, exported almost 2.4 billion Euro worth of military hardware in 2025. While Hungary’s military trade numbers pale in comparison to its Slavic neighbors to the north, the recent change in government in Budapest may represent an opportunity to increase exports.

In Search of Political Will

Military budgets, size of armies, number of tanks, fighter aircraft, and artillery pieces are all subject to quantitative analysis. What is harder to gauge, however, is the political resolve of a country’s leadership to meet previously agreed-upon defense commitments to the NATO alliance. In this realm, substantive questions remain across the three nations featured in this study.

Starting in the south, Hungary may represent the best hope in the near to mid term to provide NATO a dependable partner at the center of its eastern front. This is obviously paradoxical as, until recently, Budapest was considered the black sheep of the NATO family, viewed in Brussels as the most pro-Kremlin government in the alliance. Viktor Orbán’s populist reign came to an ignominious denouement in April of 2026 with his thrashing at the Hungarian polls by rival Péter Magyar. While it is still very early in the new government’s rule in Budapest, initial indications are that Hungary intends to come out of the NATO cold to become a more reliable alliance partner in the heart of Europe. In one of his initial press conferences following his landslide April election romp, Magyar stated, “Hungary will once again be a strong ally within the EU and NATO”. Time will tell if Budapest’s actions in support of the alliance meet the lofty rhetoric.  

Much more unsettling for Brussels is the putative political reticence of the leadership in the former Czechoslovakia to meet their respective defense commitments. In Slovakia, cantankerous Prime Minister Robert Fico has, since his return to power in 2023, often tried to out-Orbán his Hungarian counterpart in resisting NATO support to Kyiv. In fact, Fico is the only NATO or EU leader to visit Moscow in both 2025 and 2026 during early May celebrations commemorating the anniversary of the end of WWII. In June of 2025, the Slovak leader publicly proclaimed that Bratislava might consider becoming a neutral state given NATO’s perceived focus on rearmament. Though nothing has come of his inflammatory discourse, Fico remains a political wildcard in a country bordering Ukraine.          

It is also worth noting that Slovakia will go to the polls by the autumn of 2027 and, if past campaigns are any barometer of what to expect, Fico and his Smer (Slovak: direction) party are likely to play the peace/war card to solidify support amongst a populace that is growing exceedingly war weary. In the short term, though, the recent electoral earthquake in Hungary may temper Fico’s performative pacifist rage somewhat as Viktor Orban’s over-the-top anti-war strategy failed miserably. Nevertheless, it is not a particularly bold prediction to anticipate that Fico’s Slovakia will remain a challenge for the alliance for the remainder of his term.

Arguably the most disappointing of the three Central European states from NATO’s perspective is the Czech Republic. As recently as a year ago Prague was viewed by many in the alliance as one of the defense rocks of the Eastern front, with a pro-NATO/Ukraine government and an eloquent, fiercely pro-Kyiv president, both championing a successful, Czech-led munitions initiative critical to Ukraine’s battlefield resilience. The winds of political change, however, as they often do in these troubled lands between the Danube and the Carpathian mountains, returned to power in late 2025 Andrej Babiš, a Trumpian businessman carrying a barely-disguised disdain for the military realm.

 In the first half of 2026, the new Czech government has openly feuded with President Pavel on defense matters, specifically Prague’s commitment (or lack thereof) to its previous NATO commitments. The disputes have reached a level of rancor that, as of this writing (June 2026), the government is forbidding President Pavel from attending the early July 2026 NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey. This is a complete reversal of post-1989 Czech political tradition whereby the president represents the Czechs at NATO and United Nations meetings while the Prime Minister owns that responsibility for all EU gatherings.

Notwithstanding the ongoing drama with the president, the Babiš regime has installed a relative lightweight, Jaromír Zůna, at the Ministry of Defense, subordinated much of the country’s foreign policy to Petr Macinka, a follower of former President Václav Klaus, an unrepentant NATO and EU sceptic, and shamelessly tried to include financial outlays for a military hospital and road construction in its plan to meet the minimum two percent of GDP goal. Even the usually-supportive U.S. Ambassador to Prague, Nicholas Merrick, criticized Prague in early March of 2026 that “they risked, from the GDP percentage standpoint, being one of the weakest countries in the alliance.” In short, defense spending does not seem to be a priority for the Babiš government. In comparison with Bratislava, though, there are no elections on the horizon in the Czech Republic so the leadership in Prague will likely continue to constitute a vulnerability at the center of the alliance’s eastern front.  

In closing, it must be stressed that this sector of the alliance’s eastern wall is not static. As recently as May 13, 2026, Russian Shahed drones pounded the western Ukrainian city of Uzhhorod, hard on the border with both Slovakia and Hungary. The attack underlined the premise that not only the Baltic states, the long Polish frontier, and the Black Sea region are areas of concern for NATO headquarters in Brussels. The center of the alliance’s eastern periphery is also in the Kremlin’s crosshairs. Only time will tell whether the primary NATO states of this region, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, are up to the task of deterring Russian aggression along this critical front.

Featured Image: US Patriot missile batteries from the 5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery Regiment stand ready at sunset in Poland on April 10, 2022.

Image Credit: US Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Christopher Smith, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons