NATO and Europe

Are the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary up to the task of deterring Russian aggression in NATO's Eastern Flank?

In this article the author writes about the experience of Russia's war in Ukraine from her personal perspective. The views expressed in this article are author’s own.

It is undeniable that the defense industries of most European states have seen rapid growth and development over the past four years. These changes are most evident in the states bordering Russia and Belarus—the Baltic states, Poland, and Finland. However, despite a shared history and geopolitical challenges since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, these states have pursued very different approaches to defense policy.

The Western Balkans’ geographical proximity to Ukraine, coupled with its cost-effective labor force and existing logistics networks, positions the region as an ideal manufacturing hub for the Ukrainian war effort.

President Donald Trump and his acolytes have argued that the US needs to absorb the island of Greenland for its raw materials, to ensure US security, and to prevent aggressive powers like China and Russia from taking it first.

Breaking Russia’s kill chain requires making escalation ineffective rather than trying to manage it or wait it out. The aim is to ensure that each step of a hybrid campaign, up to and including controlled military escalation, produces strategic losses for Moscow instead of gains. This is where resilience and all domain defense become operational concepts that directly deny the Kremlin’s expectation that pressure and blackmail will eventually pay off.

Despite the momentum gained at the end of 2025 in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, driven by President Donald Trump, there is no sign of a compromise acceptable to both sides.

Donald Trump and those around him are drunk on the elixir of American military power; it is only a matter of time before they plunge the US - and the world - into a catastrophe.

When a flock of Shaheds crossed the border into Poland on Sept. 10, 2025, NATO forces had two choices. The first was to send up NATO-supplied F-16 fighters armed with $500,000 apiece Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. The second was to ignore the Russian drones and pretend nothing was wrong — the choice that Romania made in response to a similar Russian incursion days later.

By the end of 2025, it became clear that the Trump administration is prepared to sacrifice both Ukraine and Transatlanticism to the quest for better ties with Moscow.  President Trump’s recent interview with Politico and the administration’s National Security Strategy espouse a view of a Europe where leaders are weak, societies are decadent and at risk of “civilizational erasure,” and values must be resisted by Washington along with far-right European parties.

The second Trump administration has rapidly upended US–EU economic relations, replacing decades of low tariffs and open investment with sweeping protectionism driven by President Trump’s long-standing zero-sum, mercantilist worldview. Although Europe initially hoped for negotiated, reciprocal liberalization, it instead accepted a highly unbalanced arrangement largely because its dependence on US security guarantees constrained its ability to retaliate.

Lithuania passed the test posed by the first Trump administration with flying colors. At a time when most European allies were rattled by the president’s brusque style and criticisms of European free-riding, Lithuania more than doubled its defense spending between President Trump’s election in 2016 and his departure from office in 2021.

A withdrawal of American troops from Romania at a critical time in negotiations on Ukraine would be a serious mistake. Russia would take it as the U.S. giving it a free hand to act in the Black Sea, region which would increase tensions and the risk of escalation.

NATO’s eastern periphery remains volatile and exposed to critical weaknesses in regional infrastructure. This continues to hinder military integration and rapid reinforcement.

The brief assesses Russia’s strategic options for continued westward aggression, concluding that the Danube Mouth axis represents the most rewarding, probable, and operationally realistic path. Since 2022, the US has strengthened its security posture in Romania, recognizing the region's strategic vulnerability, while the EU maintains its conflict-averse posture, emphasizing negotiation over deterrence