The Kill Chain Comes to NATO: A Fictional Crisis with Real Lessons

Prologue: A Crisis That Has Not Happened Yet

Putin, increasingly frustrated by Russia’s disastrous performance in Ukraine, has decided to aim even higher in pursuit of his legacy: to achieve Russia’s most important strategic objective for decades, undermining NATO. He does not believe he can defeat NATO by force. He believes he can paralyze it from within.

In recent National Security Council sessions, he insists that NATO’s political cohesion is eroding and that Allies would be unable to reach a consensus on invoking Article 5 in a crisis on the eastern flank. His closest advisers echo this view. Intelligence briefings do not fully confirm it, but few around the table challenge the premise.

The Kremlin launches a cross ministerial planning effort to design a calibrated, multi domain campaign to test NATO’s credibility, culminating in a staged military incident. The logic is simple. If there is an attack on a NATO member and the Alliance fails to respond adequately, this will amount to a strategic decapitation of NATO. The incident must be serious enough to look like an armed attack, yet murky enough in attribution to preserve deniability. One minister quotes the president to senior staff: “They will not act, I know it in my gut, and even if they do, we will find a way to de escalate if needed.”

Within weeks, the task force delivers a campaign plan. Some elements are already unfolding. A large disinformation drive targets Latvia, claiming that Ukraine and NATO intend to build a joint biological laboratory in Latgale, a borderline region with a high share of Russian speakers. Deep fake videos of Ukrainian and NATO officials appear across Russian language social media, supposedly confirming the project and linking it to the type of the lab that caused coronavirus outbreak.

Protests spread through Latgale, drawing in groups with suspected ties to Russian special services. Demonstrations escalate into riots and attacks on local administration buildings. Provocateurs call for Russian intervention to protect the rights of Russian speakers. Latvian authorities detain several violent participants, including Russian citizens believed to work for Russian intelligence.

Moscow demands their immediate release and threatens severe retaliation. At the same time, coordinated drone flights cross Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Polish airspace from Russian and Belarusian territory. Most drones are intercepted, yet the synchronized pattern exposes gaps in allied air defense and decision making.

While public threats from Moscow continue, groups of unidentified activists appear along Latvia’s border with Russia and Belarus, damaging infrastructure and clashing with border guards in the name of solidarity with the detainees and protesters. Russian state media broadcast images of elite airborne units preparing to “rescue” Russian citizens from Latvian custody.

Even after Latvia agrees to transfer the prisoners through diplomatic channels, the crisis sharpens. Armed men in unmarked uniforms seize a municipal building in Daugavpils, the largest city in Latgale. The Kremlin denies any role but praises the “courageous defenders” of Russian compatriots. Unconfirmed reports say an airborne jet, took off a few minutes ago. Supposedly elite unites are tasked to carry out the rescue operation, but propaganda channels also imply that the mission could evolve into establishing a temporary control and normalizing situation in the destabilized region.

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This scenario is fictional. It has not happened yet. The central puzzle is how to assess whether such a scenario is realistic and what could trigger it. Opinions in the Euro Atlantic area vary dramatically. At the heart of this debate lies the question of whether Russia is too overstretched to expand the conflict or whether the Kremlin still believes it can exploit hesitation and fragmentation in Western capitals.

For readers far from NATO’s eastern flank, such a scenario may sound exaggerated. In the frontline states, it does not. There, hybrid escalation is a real and familiar concern. Defense and security institutions train for it, but so do societies in a broader sense. People debate these scenarios openly, follow developments closely, and discuss risks of disinformation, provocation, and escalation not only in expert circles, but in everyday conversations, in schools, in local communities, and around family tables. What may appear hypothetical in many Western capitals reflects patterns that feel immediate and plausible to those living closest to Russia’s pressure.

Everything in this scenario reflects real methods that Russia has already used in Georgia, Ukraine, and beyond. The question is not whether Moscow has such a playbook, but whether it judges conditions favorable enough to run this kind of experiment against a NATO member.

From Soviet Active Measures to Putin’s Kill Chain

What appears in Latgale as a novel crisis is in fact an updated chapter in a much longer story. During the Cold War, Soviet leaders invested heavily in so-called active measures, a toolbox of influence and subversion designed to weaken adversaries from within. One of the clearest public explanations of this approach is the four stages pattern described byformer KGB defector Yuri Bezmenov. Active measures later adapted to the new realities in post-Soviet times and gradually transformed into modern day Russian hybrid warfare strategy.

In that framework, ideological subversion progresses through demoralization, destabilization, crisis, and normalization, each targeting different layers of society over different time horizons. Demoralization, often spanning ten to fifteen years, focuses on reshaping values and perceptions through education, media, culture, and public discourse. Destabilization is shorter and aims at institutions such as the economy, law enforcement, and foreign policy. Crisis compresses the shock into weeks, and normalization consolidates a new status quo, often enforced by authoritarian power.

The crucial point is that Soviet active measures relied primarily on overt, legal, and non-violent channels. They were slow, deep, and well resourced. Their aim was to rewire how societies saw themselves and the world, so that political outcomes favorable to Moscow seemed natural or inevitable.

The fictional Latgale crisis shows many of the same ingredients: long standing identity tensions, seeded narratives about abandoned Russian speakers, and the use of media and civil protest as levers. But under Vladimir Putin these tools are now integrated into a far more compressed and coercive pattern, described as a five step kill chain in the analysis of Russia’s hybrid warfare.

Russia’s modern hybrid warfare kill chain works as follows. First, Russia weaponizes a vulnerability to create a crisis. Second, it initiates negotiations from a position of manufactured strength to impose new post crisis realities. Third, it escalates and makes threats while negotiating. Fourth, it obtains concessions. Fifth, it secures gains and immediately searches for new vulnerabilities to continue the pattern.

In the Latgale scenario, the vulnerability is the presence of a significant Russian speaking minority, combined with local grievances and weak social cohesion. The disinformation campaign, deep fakes, and orchestrated protests turn that vulnerability into a controlled crisis. Drone incursions and unmarked armed men escalate the situation while preserving deniability, preparing grounds for kinetic aggression. Moscow’s demands and threats aim to force concessions from Latvia and test NATO’s will to respond.

Compared with the Soviet era, the difference is tempo and cost. Active measures were slow, patient, and resource intensive. Hybrid warfare and the kill chain are opportunistic, lightning quick, and relatively cheap. They rely on constantly testing red lines and exploiting escalation potential as a strategic asset. The continuity lies in the strategic goal: Russia has consistently sought to achieve revisionist geopolitical objectives by shaping and coercing societies rather than simply defeating armies.

The Weaponization of Everything

The fictional Baltics scenario is a textbook example of what Russian hybrid warfare has become: the weaponization of everything. Instead of separating military and nonmilitary instruments, Moscow treats all elements of national power as interchangeable tools in a single campaign.

In Latgale, information is weaponized through disinformation about a supposed biological laboratory and through deep fake videos that exploit existing fears and builds on the memories from the coronavirus pandemic. Society is weaponized by mobilizing protests, infiltrating them with provocateurs, and turning some citizens into instruments of foreign policy. Borders are weaponized through orchestrated incursions by unidentified activists and drone flights designed to expose gaps in allied readiness. Even diplomatic channels are weaponized when the issue of detainees becomes a pretext for threats and ultimatums.

This reflects a broader pattern. Russian hybrid warfare assumes a constant conflict environment in which the boundary between peace and war is blurred. The aim is to remain below the threshold of open armed conflict, especially in NATO territory, while still creating enough pressure and ambiguity to force political concessions. The Latgale scenario illustrates exactly that threshold game: serious enough to provoke fear of escalation, murky enough to fuel arguments against a strong response.

Another key feature is customization. There is no one size fits all hybrid template. The campaign is carved around the specific vulnerabilities of the target. In Ukraine this meant exploiting political fragmentation, weak institutions, and the legacy of Soviet era networks. In the Baltics it would mean focusing on Russian speaking minorities, historical memory, and perceived inequities. In each case, the kill chain is adapted to local conditions, but the logic is the same, with the dramatic difference being NATO guarantees in Baltics as opposed to Ukraine. 

The success of this pattern depends on Russia’s ability to manage escalation dynamics. In the Latgale narrative, Moscow escalates in steps: information operations, protests, drones, unidentified armed groups, and finally implied limited incursion or a special operation. Each step is calibrated to increase pressure without triggering an effective Article 5 response. The Kremlin’s bet, expressed in the fictional quote “They will not act,” is that NATO will argue itself into inaction. Exactly that bet on inaction makes this scenario so realistic and dangerous.

Ukraine as the Real World Warning

The fictional crisis in Latgale draws heavily on real world precedents, especially Russia’s campaigns against Ukraine. In 2014, during the annexation of Crimea, unmarked Russian troops, the so called little green men, seized key facilities while Moscow denied formal involvement, deliberately creating confusion and delay in both Ukrainian and international responses. In Donbas, a mix of separatists, local militias, Russian irregulars, and special forces operated under a fog of deniability, reinforced by an intensive disinformation campaign that obscured responsibility and complicated attribution.

Just as important as the presence of deniable force was the paralysis it induced in Kyiv’s decision making. At the time, Ukraine’s political leadership was in turmoil, with multiple defense ministers rotating within weeks. Units on the ground in Crimea were waiting for clear instructions that never came, while authority in the capital was fragmented and contested. This breakdown of command and control effectively neutralized Ukraine’s ability to respond, allowing Russia to consolidate its gains without facing organized resistance. The episode illustrates a core objective of hybrid warfare, not to defeat an adversary militarily at once, but to disrupt decision making so thoroughly that even capable forces are unable to act in time. Analysts of Russian new generation warfare note that in this doctrine the main battlespace is the mind and that new generation wars are dominated by information and psychological warfare aimed at demoralizing enemy forces and populations. The Latgale scenario mirrors this logic: the campaign begins in the information space and in the streets, not with tanks.

At the same time, hybrid warfare does not change the nature of war itself. It is important to note that violence remains at the core of hybrid warfare as it does in any other form of war and that its aim is still to gain advantage through the threat or use of organized violence. In Ukraine, non military tools paved the way for military intervention. In Latgale, the appearance of armed men in unmarked uniforms and the report of an airborne jet play the same role. They are the shadow of violence that gives teeth to the earlier stages of the kill chain. 

The run up to the full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 shows the kill chain operating at strategic scale. The Zapad 2021 exercise signaled an escalatory posture by rehearsing nuclear strike and occupation of NATO territory. The completion of Nord Stream 2 increased Russia’s leverage over European energy markets and was followed by manipulation of energy prices. The Belarus enabled European Union border crisis weaponized migration against Poland and the Baltic states. These steps built a multi domain pressure campaign that culminated in troop buildups around Ukraine’s borders, ultimatums to NATO and the United States, and finally the invasion itself.

The analysis suggests that this time the kill chain failed because Ukraine and the West were no longer unprepared. Ukraine had strengthened its resilience since 2014, and Western allies responded with greater unity and resolve. The chain was interrupted, and Russia’s strategic and operational weaknesses were exposed on the battlefield. The lesson is clear: hybrid warfare is highly effective against a fragmented and unprepared target, but it can be blunted by societal resilience and coherent collective action.

Russia is now effectively stuck in the escalation phase of its own kill chain. For four years since 2022, it has been raising the stakes without being able to reach the next stage. Moscow understands that it cannot achieve its maximalist goal of occupying and controlling all of Ukraine, nor can it credibly secure even a minimal threshold of decisive victory, understood as full control and consolidation of the five regions it has claimed as its own. As a result, the war has shifted into a phase of political warfare in which outcomes will be decided primarily outside the battlefield, through pressure, signaling, and bargaining. Putin’s calculus is that the only remaining path to his objectives is to keep escalating until it finally yields concessions and allows him to move to the next step of the kill chain.

The fictional Latgale scenario therefore poses a direct question about that calculus: does Moscow expect NATO today to respond as the West did in 2014, as in 2022, or as it should in the case of an attack on an ally, by invoking the full force of Article 5. The answer will depend on the choices and preparations made now.

Breaking the Kill Chain: Making Escalation Ineffective

Breaking Russia’s kill chain requires making escalation ineffective rather than trying to manage it or wait it out. The aim is to ensure that each step of a hybrid campaign, up to and including controlled military escalation, produces strategic losses for Moscow instead of gains. This is where resilience and all domain defense become operational concepts that directly deny the Kremlin’s expectation that pressure and blackmail will eventually pay off.

First, resilience must concentrate on political cohesion and effective coordination between state institutions and societal structures. Raising the level of trust in society requires treating trust as a strategic capability rather than a byproduct of governance. Russia understands well that open societies are particularly vulnerable to the erosion of trust, and that polarization is the easiest vulnerability to weaponize. Disinformation is used systematically to deepen social divides, exploit uncertainty and fear, and undermine confidence in authorities, media, and democratic processes. The early stages of the kill chain therefore target the information and cognitive space, amplifying doubts and existing grievances in order to paralyze decision making.

Cognitive aspects of warfare show that societies fracture not because they lack tools, but because they lack clarity, purpose, and confidence in whole-of-society action. Countering this requires a proactive mindset that prioritizes transparency, consistency, and preparedness. If political elites, central government, local authorities, independent media, and civil society maintain high levels of trust and well rehearsed channels of cooperation, attempts to inflame tensions or fabricate scandals are far less likely to generate fragmentation. This is where psychological and cognitive resilience becomes indispensable. Trust grows when governments communicate early and honestly about risks, explain decisions and trade offs clearly, and demonstrate that they understand emerging threats. Investing in civic education, media literacy, and regular whole of society crisis exercises helps citizens recognize manipulation and feel equipped rather than overwhelmed. Preparedness then becomes a shared project rather than a state only exercise. Citizens understand what is happening, whom to trust, and why coordinated action matters, denying adversaries the confusion and hesitation on which hybrid escalation depends.

 Second, an all domain defense posture is needed to counter an all domain attack, but its political backbone is unity of decision making. Russia’s hybrid pattern combines information operations, cyber activity, covert action, border incidents, and conventional forces. These can only be managed effectively if political processes are designed to absorb ambiguity without freezing. Pre-agreed procedures for joint assessment, rapid consultation, and shared public messaging between national authorities and key societal actors allow escalation to be met with coherent responses rather than competing narratives.

Third, deterrence depends on demonstrating both capability and will, including a credible readiness to use force if necessary. One of the Kremlin’s core bets is that ambiguity and calibrated escalation will push Western leaders toward restraint and internal debate, not toward resolve. Breaking the kill chain means reversing that bet: making clear that hybrid coercion, including deniable or limited uses of force, increases the likelihood of a strong and unified response rather than diluting it. Clear political resolve, visible readiness, and practiced crisis communication all contribute to showing that further pressure will not split societies from their governments or governments from their allies.

Finally, the strategic message to Moscow must be that blackmail will not work now or later. If allies respond to pressure by seeking temporary de-escalation at the expense of principle or territory, they validate the kill chain and invite future iterations. If, instead, escalation reliably hardens political cohesion, deepens state–society solidarity, and triggers tangible costs for Russia, the logic of the kill chain breaks down. Making escalation ineffective in this way is the essence of breaking the pattern: it shifts the Kremlin’s cost benefit calculation from “press until they yield” to “press and we lose more than we gain,” shrinking the space for hybrid adventures like the fictional Latgale crisis.

Image: Three French Air and Space Force Rafale C aircraft from Mont-de-Marsan, Fighter Regiment 2/30, Normandie-Niémen, fly alongside a U.S. Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker from the 100th Air Refueling Wing, RAF Mildenhall, England, during exercise Atlantic Trident 25 over Finland, June 26, 2025. Atlantic Trident 25 focuses on integrated operations with NATO Allies to ensure the alliance is capable of projecting lethality and readiness throughout the European area of responsibility. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Christopher Campbell).

Image Credit: U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Christopher Campbell, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons