Donald Trump, Ukraine, and European Security: A Second Munich

Moreover, the EU is a hindrance to American interests, so it must be broken. Trump and his team uniformly believe that Ukraine cannot defeat Russia and are ready to pressure it to surrender territory for nebulous or even nonexistent security guarantees. Instead, they wish to make deals with Moscow, reinstate it in the G8, and refund it the monies confiscated by the EU in the wake of the war with Ukraine. Indeed, an idea floating around Washington involves the US standing up “a new ‘Core 5’ group of countries—including China and Russia—bringing traditional adversaries closer and offering a sharp contrast with the existing G7.”

“The Peace Process For Ukraine”

The recent course of peace plans for the war in Ukraine reflects this trend. Originally, Moscow presented a 28-point plan initiated by Kremlin envoy Kirill Dmitriev and agreed to by President Trump’s emissary, Steven Witkoff, and Trump. Then, a revised draft “peace plan” initiated by the UK, Germany, and France and negotiated with Washington and Kyiv, supplanted that draft. This revision was necessary because the original document betrayed Ukraine, undermined European security, and weakened the Transatlantic alliance. Thus, the original draft represented a second Munich accord. Worse, Trump’s acceptance of the original text revealed a dismaying ignorance of the issues that can only erode confidence in American judgment, leadership, and commitment to European security. Indeed, the new draft improved on this first draft.

The original draft trampled on key issues; therefore, accepting that draft revealed a glaring ignorance of the issues at stake: the inadmissibility of territorial conquest by aggression, Ukraine’s constitution, and NATO’s membership rules. Allowing Russia to ride roughshod over these principles undermines many of the foundations of European and international order just as the Munich Agreement did. And, if Russian demands upon Ukraine were accepted, that would have placed a major question mark over NATO and other US alliances. 

First, as Moscow now admits, the Russian government wrote the 28-point plan. Thus, its acceptance as a peace plan reflected a slipshod, unprofessional approach to negotiating with Russia. Second, like Munich, it was negotiated over the heads of Ukraine and Europe and then presented as an ultimatum to Ukraine. This new version, however, resulted from European, Ukrainian, and American participation and has thereby reduced Russia’s draft to 19 points, leaving the issues of Ukrainian territory to be settled between Kyiv and Washington and then, hopefully, Moscow. In addition, the negotiators scrapped some paragraphs, e.g., the suggestion to readmit Russia into the G8 or allow the United States to use frozen Russian assets, mostly held in European countries, to fund reconstruction efforts. This point clearly represented Moscow’s efforts to bribe the administration into accepting Russian demands.

The new draft also removed bilateral issues of US-Russian relations from the original draft. Likewise, issues regarding Ukraine and NATO membership were removed as the original draft gave Moscow a veto over Ukrainian membership there. Instead, this was supposed to be an issue for NATO and Ukraine alone. Since Ukraine’s constitution prohibits the transfer of land to another state, territorial revisions demanded by Moscow of land it has not conquered were also left to Ukrainian President Zelensky’s authority.

Third, like Munich, the original accord gives Russia the Donbas territories it has not conquered, formally recognizes Donbas and Crimea as Russian territory, and allows Russian occupation of Zaporizhiye and Kherson. It limits Ukraine’s army to 600,000, sets draconian      limits on the weapons it can have or receive from the West, and bars Ukraine from NATO. The new version capped Ukraine’s army at 800,000, its present number, leaving it to Ukraine and its interlocutors to negotiate territorial issues, while leaving open arms transfers to Ukraine.

Fourth, again like Munich, the original document imposes Kremlin restrictions and demands, e.g., an election within 100 days, an end to so-called Nazi propaganda (i.e., Ukrainian nationalist and pro-independence speech), and the granting of a legal status to the Russian language and the Russian Orthodox Church (hallowed instruments of Russification and empire). Once again the ignorance of US officials on these points is clear.

Fifth, once the negative reaction began coming in from the G20, Europe, and Capitol Hill, Secretary of State Rubio told Senators that this was a leaked Russian draft wish list, not a US proposal. The White House immediately pressured him to reverse course and forced him to claim this was a US draft—an assertion that was promptly reasserted by President Trump, thus advertising his own ignorance of the issues and his sympathy with Putin’s position. Indeed, this whole affair highlights divisions in the White House and a broken policy process. 

Worse yet, and besides the undermining of confidence in Rubio, Trump, and US foreign policy generally, is the fact that the original document unilaterally destroys the sanctions regime that is crippling Russia’s economy. Specifically, it says that “the United States will enter into a long-term economic cooperation agreement for mutual development in the areas of energy, natural resources, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, data centers, rare earth metal extraction projects in the Arctic, and other mutually beneficial corporate opportunities.” This clause will reintegrate Russia into the global economy. But there is no mention in the original draft of restitution, reparations, or the return of kidnapped children. Since Russia has played this game of offering its resources to the West in the 1920s and after 1991, disappointing investors both times, this point amounts to selling the same horse thrice. Fortunately, the new version omitted this and other efforts to bribe the administration into accepting Russia’s goals.

The European draft also improved upon the original version by reconfirming Ukrainian membership in the EU. Even more importantly, the new draft openly discussed US-backed security guarantees for Ukraine that “mirror” Article V guarantees, i.e., guarantees resembling NATO membership. These guarantees evidently allowed for the stationing of NATO members’ forces in Ukraine backed up by US aerial assets stationed in Poland should Russia attack again.  Moreover, according to President Zelensky’s former Chief of Staff, Andriy Yermak, “the new draft would make US security guarantees ‘legally binding’ and not contingent on Ukraine formally abandoning its constitutional commitment to eventually join NATO.” While an ideal outcome would take Ukraine into NATO as soon as possible, that is clearly not possible now.  Nevertheless, experience has shown that Ukrainian security is inseparable from that of Europe. Moreover, European security in any imaginable form is incompatible with a revived Russian empire since an empire, by definition, means war against neighbors. 

However, the Trump administration took this European draft, apparently revised it to suit Moscow’s interests, and sent Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to Moscow with a third, 27-point draft. Although its text is secret, the revised draft clearly gives Russia the territories it wants, including yet unconquered territories. It keeps Ukraine out of NATO, concedes to Russia its long-standing demand for an election which Russia will subvert, and thus accepts Moscow’s argument that the Zelensky regime is undemocratic and opening Ukraine to massive subversion in the wake of a profound demoralization. The draft contains no mention of security guarantees nor any word about reparations, war crimes trials, and the return of thousands of deported children. Trump and his team have publicly spoken of returning to Russia the funds confiscated by the EU and putting Russia back in the G8 as if nothing had happened. Thus, the Trump administration apparently went right back to the original 28-point draft, only slightly amended, and betrayed Ukraine and its European allies in return for vague promises of investments.  Consequently, this agreement looks like a second Munich.

Putin has stated that the original 28-point draft, authored by Russia, could serve as the basis for negotiation. Once the original draft has undergone substantial revision,  Russian spokesmen predictably complained that “it doesn’t fit us at all” or that it diverges from what was supposedly agreed to at the summit in Anchorage. This was surprising, for it seemed that nothing was agreed to at Anchorage. Now, Putin and Russian spokesmen admit that a framework for an accord emerged from those talks. We can see that this framework has held, and Russia is on the verge of obtaining its goals: the destruction of an independent Ukraine and the splintering of NATO.

This episode was not the only example of Trump’s ignorance of European issues. In earlier conversations with Hungarian President, Victor Orban, Trump fell for Orban’s argument that Hungary needed an exemption from sanctions on Russian oil and gas because Hungary is landlocked, so it has no choice but to keep buying it. Although the Czech Republic is also landlocked, it has joined the sanctions and is not regretting this decision. There is no genuine policy process regarding Europe or Ukraine. 

This entire history from start to finish also highlights the fact that the administration’s overall policy process is broken, possibly irretrievably. Evidently, the policy and personal divisions impeding a competent policy process have not been addressed (e.g., the layoffs of May-June 2025 appear to have crippled the National Security Council’s functioning regarding Europe ).  Such episodes also highlight the absence of competent briefers as well as the willful ignorance of key officials on critical European issues, both being signs of a broken policy process. Moreover, the policy infighting continues as “officials stated that arms supplies to Ukraine are limited and cannot continue indefinitely, emphasizing the desire to end the war.” If this infighting continues, it will further deprive the administration of any means to advance American interests in Europe and elsewhere. Indeed, sending Ambassador Witkoff, who has chiefly distinguished himself as being unduly susceptible to Russian arguments, back to Moscow should have sent up a warning sign.

Therefore, Europe and Ukraine are now on their own, and the damage is done. Many European observers openly voiced their criticisms of Trump and his policies, and this anger and dismay will not be easily overcome. Former French President Francois Hollande remarked that Trump’s original plan reduced Europe to the status of a besieged bystander.  French observers also believe that the best strategy is to be the last one to talk to him lest he invariably return to his original uninformed ideas. Europe has already begun rearming, but it cannot match Russian power for the next five years at least. Meanwhile, the US announced, naturally without consultations, that it will begin reducing its forces in Europe in 2027.  This disastrous policy regarding Europe evokes the biblical story of Esau selling his birthright for “a mess of pottage.” But compared to the administration’s sellout of its allies, he may have gotten a better deal than Trump did. Worse, our allies have now been sacrificed for the lure of profit. Our allies in Asia should realize that this can happen. As noted above, the viability of their alliance with Washington now lies under a question mark.  Therefore, since nothing stands in the way of the Russo-Chinese tandem, if not alliance, we should not be surprised to see a repeat performance of this sordid drama beyond Europe.

 Image: President Donald J. Trump and President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation | July 16, 2018 (Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead). Photo Credit: White House Flickr. https://flickr.com/photos/148748355@N05/42547210635