Russian Mobilization in 2026: The Odds Are Even

Sources inside Russia are reportedly discussing rumors of another large-scale mobilization to rapidly provide the Russian military with thousands more people and resources after Russia’s September elections.  One Russian war blogger noted the current rumor suggests a number as high as 1.2 million personnel. Indeed, Russia’s military circumstances in Ukraine and at home are looking more dire with some similarities to September 2022, just prior to the last partial mobilization.  Russia has since tried to avoid another formal mobilization, probably to avoid involving Russia’s urban elites.  However, evidence also suggests Russian President Vladimir Putin may not consider a large-scale mobilization necessary because he may believe Russian forces continue to make territorial gains in Ukraine at an acceptable rate.  His voice is the only one that matters and he is unlikely to say anything before deciding.  Thus, as of July 2026, the odds of another large-scale mobilization before the end of 2026 are roughly even. This paper will provide a list of indicators observers can use to gauge whether mobilization is more or less likely to occur as the months move forward.  In addition, this paper will explore ways Russia might use additional combat power beyond Ukraine that could impact Europe and the NATO Alliance. 

Mobilization: Why Now?

The term “mobilization” describes a state’s process for calling up resources and additional personnel, often with prior military experience, to fight a war. In its war plans, the Soviet Union built a system to rapidly recall hundreds of thousands of former conscripts to fill out some of its units to augment its already huge standing force.  As part of its ongoing military reform efforts in the 2000s, the Russian Federation began developing a voluntary reserve program in 2014, but it never fully abandoned the requirement or mechanisms for large-scale mobilization.  The 2022 invasion of Ukraine relied on Russia’s continuous readiness units that were clearly not capable of meeting the Kremlin’s goals for a host of reasons. By late 2022, Russian forces in Ukraine were losing territory, manpower, and equipment to Ukrainian attacks and Russia’s hold on Crimea was potentially threatened.  To meet that crisis, Putin ordered a partial mobilization of a reported 300,000 former conscripts and others with special skills.  Russia has since relied on what the Center for Naval Analysis calls  “covert mobilization” to provide “volunteers” for its special military operation by offering high enlistment bonuses, cajoling conscripts into signing extended service contracts, enlisting convicts and foreigners, and other measures to avoid a formal large-scale mobilization that could involve much broader segments of Russian society.

Russian nationalists and war bloggers cite several reasons a full-scale mobilization of Russian society is vital now.  For example, they argue that Russia now faces serious setbacks on the battlefield and Russia’s contract enlistment program is not providing enough combat power to defeat Ukraine or to defend Russia’s territory.  In fact, fewer recruits are signing contracts in Russia’s regions and those willing to serve frequently aren’t fit.  In addition, the bloggers lament that the Russian military is increasingly unable to defend Russia’s key domestic infrastructure, lines of communication, and the vital Crimean Peninsula from Ukrainian long-range strikes.  They appear to believe that only a full-scale mobilization will provide enough manpower and other resources to overcome Ukraine’s remaining defenses while also adequately defending the Russian homeland and occupied territories.  Finally, they argue that US and European support for Ukraine is facilitating these long-range strikes and keeping Ukraine in the war; only drastic steps like full-scale mobilization, an attack on NATO territory, or the use of nuclear weapons can save Russia from defeat and civilizational collapse.    

At the same time, another large-scale mobilization poses challenges and risks that even some of the war bloggers acknowledge.  First, on a massive scale, Russian local authorities must identify hundreds of thousands of persons eligible for mobilization and screen them for fitness, inducting those who meet these criteria.  Next those people must receive refresher training and basic equipment, then be incorporated into existing units or into new formations in a relatively short time. In 2022, Russian mobilization authorities reportedly had extreme difficulty in identifying eligible personnel due to inaccurate records and corruption and couldn’t provide rudimentary training or equipment.  At least one nationalist blogger laments that the system hasn’t improved much since.  In 2022, mobilization also proved unpopular and hundreds of thousands of Russians fled the country rather than enter the Army, exacerbating labor shortages and other economic issues at home.  Finally, domestic support for Putin’s regime and the war has probably weakened since September 2022, making another large-scale mobilization politically problematic, particularly if it involves Russia’s urbanized elites.  The timing of a potential mobilization after elections isn’t a coincidence. 

Decision Drivers

Several factors will likely play a part in any mobilization decision.  A prominent one is the security of Crimea.  Russia considers Crimea a part of its historical territory and the peninsula has played a vital role in the defense of Russia’s south since the 18^th century. Since 2022, it has also served as a major platform for both operational and logistical support for Russian forces in southern Ukraine.  Ukraine has severely damaged those support capacities via long-range strikes for several years, forcing the Russian Navy to largely abandon the peninsula and reducing the peninsula’s value as an operational base.  In the last few months, Ukraine’s attacks have cut off most road, rail, and maritime access from Russia to Crimea, leading to fuel rationing, the departure of tourists, and concerns that Ukraine could land forces on the peninsula itself.  Putin has a personal political stake in Russian control of the peninsula, and its extended isolation or loss of territory would dramatically undermine his credibility.  Thus, Putin’s level of concern about Russia’s ability to defend Crimea will likely influence his decision.

In addition to the security of Crimea, the security of Russia’s domestic infrastructure, particularly energy and defense plants, will also play a significant role in a decision on mobilization.  Since 2023, Ukraine has made many high-profile strikes on Russian oil refineries and defense factories, sometimes deep inside Russian territory.  This past year, these strikes have caused a fuel availability crisis in Russia for both the military and civilians, leading to economic disruptions, reduced military readiness, and extensive public frustration. If Russia’s air defense forces cannot meet this challenge, Putin may turn to mobilization to create more combat power for defensive missions within Russia along with offensives in Ukraine.

The deciding factor will probably be Putin’s personal assessment of whether hundreds of thousands more troops can provide the combat power needed to overcome Ukraine’s defenses and force a resolution of the conflict on Russia’s terms. He is probably aware that the 2022 mobilization did not provide this advantage although it did stabilize Russia’s defensive lines before Ukraine’s 2023 offensive.  Since 2023, the Russian ground forces have adopted a strategy of positional warfare rather than the rapid maneuver they attempted in 2022.  This approach involves localized attacks at great cost to win small chunks of territory, moving forward slowly while degrading Ukraine’s smaller manpower pool. These attacks are augmented by Russia’s own long-range strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure and use of uncrewed weapons and air strikes against Ukrainian logistics.

The strategy’s cost in Russian lives and equipment has been staggering.  It is also beginning to fail.  According to the Institute for the Study of War, in the last few months, Russia’s territorial gains through this approach have dropped substantially compared to 2025 while casualties have risen because of Ukraine’s own tactical adaptations.  Ukraine’s use of uncrewed systems on the battlefield and long-range strikes inside Russia make a slow, grinding strategy of attrition far less feasible. To decide to order another mobilization, Putin would need to become convinced it would provide his generals the means to begin a 2027 offensive that would result in larger territorial gains and create leverage to force Ukraine, and its NATO supporters, to concede to Russia’s terms.

While predicting what Putin will decide is fraught with peril, we can construct lists of indicators that observers can use to assess changes in the likelihood of another large-scale formal mobilization. 

Indicators that another mobilization is more likely:

·      Russian forces continue to fail in defending critical infrastructure and lines of communication from Ukrainian long-range strikes

·      Russia’s hold on portions of occupied Ukraine substantially weakens    

·      Ukraine conducts successful ground or naval raids into Crimea

·      Russia announces it has made improvements to the mobilization system or legal changes that broaden eligibility for mobilization

·      Russia closes borders with former Soviet states to prevent another mass exodus

·      Russia clamps down on bloggers or other critics of the mobilization system

·      Russian regime supporters endorse the idea of a mobilization or downplay the risks

·      The Russian military expands mobilization training facilities

·      The Russian military begins massing more supplies and equipment

·      Leaks of official decisions or leadership opinions

 Indicators that another mobilization is less likely:

·      Russia’s defense of Crimea stabilizes

·      Russia improves its ability to defend critical domestic infrastructure and lines of communication

·      Russia’s gasoline and diesel availability crisis is reduced or ends

·      Volunteer efforts and contract enlistments increase to meet battlefield requirements

·      A Russian ally provides substantial combat forces, new capabilities, or other assistance

·      Members of the NATO Alliance scale back support for Ukraine

·      Domestic discontent over potential mobilization and the war increases

·      Russian leaders publicly disavow the need for another mobilization

Map of the Russian Federation’s five military districts as of February 2024. The reestablished Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts are in the upper left in red and light green respectively.   Source: Wikipedia. 

What Is To Be Done?

Assuming they can effectively induct, train, equip, and integrate hundreds of thousands of mobilized soldiers in a few weeks, the Russian military would almost certainly use newly mobilized personnel and resources for new offensives in Ukraine.  But what else might these resources be used for?  What might concern NATO leadership as much or even more than increased offensive power in Ukraine?

One option is to quickly fill the ranks of at least some of the new and expanded units in the Leningrad Military District (LMD) and reestablish a ground force presence that has been largely missing along the borders of the Baltic States, Finland, and Sweden since 2022.  Moscow deployed virtually all the ground units in northwest Russia to Ukraine before the start of the 2022 invasion where they incurred heavy losses. Outside of a few conscripts, Russia has not had an effective ground component in the northwestern region since that time and relied almost exclusively on its Navy, Aerospace Forces, and the threat of nuclear weapons to defend the area.  In late 2022, Moscow announced its intention to reestablish the Soviet-era Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts ostensibly in response to Finland’s and Sweden’s prospective entry into NATO.  Plans for the LMD call for a vast increase in ground force capacity in Kaliningrad and along Russia’s northwestern borders by expanding some existing ground brigades into divisions and establishing new formations.  In June 2026, Finland’s Army Chief said that Russia could eventually deploy 80,000 soldiers near the Russo-Finnish border, up from 20,000 prior to 2022. 

The LMD allegedly started the process of establishing new and expanded units in 2023.  To date, many observers, including some European intelligence services, have argued that these planned expansions have occurred largely on paper as the Russian military continues to divert manpower and resources to Ukraine.  However, a mobilization of troops, particularly those with combat experience, could accelerate the process of manning and equipping at least some of these LMD units.  Russian commanders could combine mobilized former soldiers with conscripts to give select LMD units leadership and expertise in addition to manpower.  In terms of equipment, Russia is now reportedly producing several hundred new and refurbished armored vehicles a year while Russian forces in Ukraine are relying less on armor and more on dismounted infantry, drones, and airstrikes to make their miniscule gains.  This may free the Russian military to divert at least some armored vehicles and other equipment to the new units in the northwest, speeding up the process of reconstitution. 

Even with mobilization, these new or expanded units in the LMD would need time to coalesce and would still depend heavily on conscript manpower.  Unless the mobilization is massive, the Russian military is likely to fortify only a select few of these LMD formations; Ukraine would still take priority.  Given that, these LMD units will likely have a defensive orientation initially.  However, their presence in Kaliningrad and on the borders of the Baltic States, Finland, and Norway would give the Russian military additional leverage it doesn’t currently have. For example, recent newspaper reports indicate Russia may fabricate reasons to conduct drone strikes against infrastructure or even ground incursions into either the Baltic States or Poland (via Belarus or Kaliningrad), daring NATO to intervene.  In these scenarios, Russia’s objectives would be to cause NATO countries to worry about their own security instead of Ukraine’s and demonstrate that NATO’s Article V guarantee is weak, convincing those NATO members to eliminate support for Ukraine in return for an end to the Russian threat.  While more elite units would likely spearhead any Russian drone strikes or ground incursions into NATO territory, ground brigades in northwest Russia would provide a backstop and additional support along the border area that is not currently present. 

Conclusion

At this point, a large-scale Russian mobilization after Russia’s elections in 2026 is still speculative, but Russian sources and international media are discussing it.  Like the months before the last formal mobilization in late 2022, Russian forces in Ukraine face major challenges on the battlefield while the Russian government appears committed to its ambitious goals. Ukraine is also wreaking havoc on Russia’s energy infrastructure and the Russian air defense system seems unable to stop it.  Whether Putin acknowledges all these challenges or has a different view is also somewhat speculative.  Ultimately, his is the only Russian voice that really matters. 

Should Putin order another formal mobilization, most newly mobilized personnel will likely go to Russia’s efforts in Ukraine, but there are other options.  Providing resources to new or reconstituted units in other parts of Russia, particularly the LMD, is just one.  It would give the Russian military a capability along the borders of Norway, Finland, and the Baltic States it currently lacks and provide Moscow a strategic ground force reserve.  While a reconstituted ground force in northwest Russia is probably not an immediate offensive threat to NATO, Allied planners can’t overlook it.  In the longer term, adding newly mobilized personnel and other resources to the LMD now would speed up a reconstitution and enlargement process that would otherwise have taken several years.  Allied planners can’t overlook that either.

Disclaimer: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.