Resilience and Fragility of Russian Domestic Order

Introduction

The answer to the question of how to stop Russia’s war against Ukraine and establish a stable peace in Europe is impossible without understanding the internal logic of the Russian regime. For the regime, war is not a temporary instrument but a mechanism of self-preservation: it provides mobilizational legitimacy, consolidates elites, and justifies repressive governance. In this configuration, war becomes an element of regime resilience.

For a significant part of society, war is likewise perceived not as an exception, but as a normalized mode of existence of a great power. Foreign policy therefore does not emerge in a vacuum; it extends the internal logic of order. Assumptions about a “proper world,” institutional habits, and practices of control are projected outward through doctrines, diplomacy, and the use of force. Without a change in these internal incentives, any peace will remain fragile.

A useful analytical lens for this task is provided by a resilience thinking approach. Within this approach, a system is considered resilient when it possesses a clear purpose (a vision of the “good life”), a stable identity (ontological security), effective mechanisms of reproduction (institutions, practices, coercion), and the capacity to adapt without losing functionality. This perspective can be operationalized through the 3Ps framework(Power, Principles, Practices), which structures analysis along three interconnected dimensions: authority, normative foundations, and everyday mechanisms of reproduction.

Applying this framework to the Russian regime makes it possible to identify not only the foundations of its resilience but also its potential points of fragility. At the same time, such an analysis deepens our understanding of the structural patterns underlying Russian foreign policy and strategic culture.

A central concept within resilience thinking is the idea of the “good life.” This refers to a collectively shared vision of a desirable future and the path toward it. It encompasses understandings of order, justice, status, and historical mission. This vision defines what is considered normal and legitimate, what is perceived as a threat, and what counts as victory.

Ontological security refers to a sense of continuity and coherence: “we know who we are,” “our history has meaning,” “our trajectory is consistent.” The state sustains this sense through strategic narratives, institutions, educational policy, and control over memory. When this framework is stable, anxiety in the face of uncertainty diminishes, and the political order appears intelligible and structured.

Resilience emerges when the vision of the “good life” and collective identity become embedded in practices. If society accepts the proposed model of normality, it becomes willing to endure costs - so long as these costs fit within the broader narrative and do not undermine foundational meanings. The 3Ps framework allows this dynamic to be systematized. Power ensures concentration of resources and governability; Principles establish the normative horizon and legitimacy; Practices reproduce order daily through institutions, rituals, and mechanisms of control. Resilience arises when these three dimensions are aligned and mutually reinforcing.

The concept of the “good life” may contain both material and symbolic components. The material dimension concerns prosperity, security, and opportunities and often forms the basis of an implicit social contract between the state and society. By contrast, the symbolic dimension revolves around greatness, historical mission, status, and victory. When material performance becomes constrained — for example, due to economic stagnation, financial crises, or external sanctions — regimes may gradually shift the foundations of legitimacy toward symbolic compensation. Under such conditions, resilience is sustained less through tangible economic gains and more through emotionally charged narratives of pride, grievance, threat, and mobilization. What may initially appear as a temporary adjustment can, over time, transform the very logic of governance, anchoring political stability in symbolic affirmation rather than material delivery.

Risk arises when the identity of the social order becomes tightly bound to war or to a personalized leader figure. In the event of a significant shock, this can undermine not only regime legitimacy but also the coherence of the collective “we,” that is, ontological security itself. Two trajectories then become possible: intensified coercion or a crisis of meaning.

Power, Principles, and Practices of Russian Internal Order

Power

The Russian political system rests not only on coercion and repression, but also on citizens’ consent to recognize its right to rule — not out of fear or habit, but from a conviction that it is just, lawful, or necessary. Its foundation lies in trust in institutions and approval of their actions. Over the past 25 years, the structure of public trust in Russia has changed little: only the president and the security apparatus (the army and the FSB) — as symbols of state strength and prestige — along with religious organizations (primarily the Russian Orthodox Church and Islamic institutions), which act as guardians of “traditional values” and provide ideological justification for state policy, have maintained consistently high levels of support. In contrast, most social, economic, and civic institutions remain within the zone of distrust or questionable legitimacy.

Reflecting on the nature of the Russian regime’s legitimacy, two stable patterns emerge from public opinion research:

●      First, support for the leadership increases during periods of war and external confrontation. Military mobilization generates a rallying effect that temporarily raises approval not only of the president but also of institutions that are otherwise viewed with skepticism, including the State Duma, courts, and police. This dynamic became especially visible after the annexation of Crimea and again following the launch of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

●      Second, trust is highly personalized. Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings consistently exceed those of all other state institutions and tend to peak during military campaigns. The presidency functions as the symbolic center of political authority, concentrating legitimacy in a single figure.

Together, these patterns point to two interrelated mechanisms of regime legitimacy: mobilizational legitimacy, driven by narratives of external threat and collective confrontation, and personalized legitimacy, rooted in emotional identification with the leader. Rather than relying on competitive political participation, the Russian model of legitimacy is sustained through mobilization, personalization, and affective attachment to power, reproduced through institutional and ideological practices.

Principles

When analyzing Russia’s notions of the “good life” and its underlying values, it is necessary to begin with official strategic narratives. In authoritarian systems, the space for public contestation is limited, and dominant visions of social order are largely articulated from above. These narratives constitute the ideational framework through which the state defines collective purpose and legitimizes authority.

In the Russian case, this framework forms a coherent civilizational narrative presenting Russia as a sovereign and self-sufficient polity rooted in “traditional values” and positioned in opposition to the liberal West. Russia is portrayed as a global power with a distinct historical mission, the center of the Russkiy Mir, and a driver of Eurasian integration in which Europe is conceptually absorbed into a broader Greater Eurasia.

War discourse occupies a structurally central place within this worldview. The conflict with Ukraine is framed as part of a historical continuum - linked symbolically to the Second World War - and embedded in a broader civilizational confrontation with the West. This framing establishes a moral hierarchy that distinguishes defenders from adversaries and situates contemporary politics within a longer narrative of struggle.

Two interrelated principles underpin this order. The first is the flexible and abstract notion of “traditional values.” Rather than functioning as a rigid doctrine, it operates as a mechanism of moral legitimation, allowing the state to define the boundaries of acceptable belief and behavior. The second is the idea of Russian greatness and exceptionalism, which shapes a collective understanding of the “good life” as belonging to a strong, sovereign, and historically significant state.

Survey data indicate the resonance of this ideational structure. According to Levada Center polling, the meaning of being a “true Russian” is increasingly associated with loyalty to the state and its political system rather than ethnicity or religion. National pride remains closely linked to symbolic historical achievements—above all the victory in World War II, which Russians call the Great Patriotic War. This continues to function as a foundational element of collective identity.

At the same time, surveys of life priorities reveal that most Russians value material well-being, health, security, and stability. When these aspirations are not fulfilled, symbolic narratives of greatness and military strength assume greater importance. They provide psychological compensation and sustain political legitimacy, even as they reinforce a confrontational worldview that narrows strategic flexibility over time.

Practices

The evolution of Russia’s authoritarian order has long been central to debates about the trajectory of the country’s post-Soviet transformation. Increasingly, analysts argue that contemporary Russian authoritarianism should not be understood as the outcome of a failed democratic transition, but as the continuation of institutional and mental legacies inherited from the Soviet and Imperial periods. Democratic institutions were formally established, yet they were never fully institutionalized as autonomous centers of power; instead, they functioned within a system that preserved older patterns of control. This continuity has been reinforced by a political culture grounded in loyalty to the state, the elevation of state power as a symbol of order, and a form of nationalism shaped by historical grievance and ressentiment.         

Three core practices of the Russian social domain can be identified; they enjoy broad support and tend to reproduce themselves. 

The Practice of Personalized Loyalty to Putin

In the Russian context, Putin embodies not only political leadership but the structure of power itself, effectively replacing institutional trust with personalized authority. The concentration of authority in his hands has become a defining feature of the political system, reshaping the relationship between society and the state.

His enduring popularity rests in large part on emotional politics that reinterpret the traumas of the post-Soviet period - particularly the widespread sense of humiliation and loss associated with the 1990s - through narratives of restoration, pride, and renewed national greatness. For many citizens, he represents stability and the promise of restored great-power status, becoming the focal point of identification for a socially conservative majority that prioritizes order and sovereignty.

Public support is also closely linked to demonstrations of force, which are widely perceived as expressions of resolve and strength. Peaks in presidential approval have consistently coincided with major military campaigns, indicating that external conflict serves as a mechanism of political mobilization rather than a mere consequence of foreign policy. The recurring emphasis on external threat and visible displays of power thus functions as a key instrument for maintaining legitimacy, reinforcing the central role of the leader within the system.

The Practice of Ontological and Cognitive Control

The practice of ontological and cognitive control operates through the informational-ideological and cultural-educational dimensions. Contemporary Russian education is increasingly transformed into an instrument of ideological regulation and legitimization of power. The reform of educational standards, the rewriting of history textbooks, and the introduction of patriotic education programs together form a mechanism for producing a generation loyal to the state.

The sphere of historical memory occupies a central position in Russia’s system of ontological control. The state has effectively established a monopoly over memory, promoting a single “correct” historical narrative as the foundation of official identity. Any alternative interpretations of the past—such as independent historical research or civic memory initiatives—are subject to criminalization and repression, turning history into an instrument of legitimation and ideological control.

The Practice of Repressive Governance

Repression in contemporary Russia plays a system-forming role — it has become an entrenched institutional and legal practice that ensures the stability of the authoritarian regime and sustains the atmosphere of fear necessary for maintaining political passivity. Since the early 2000s, Russia has systematically adopted and implemented repressive legislation, turning repression into a mechanism of social governance. The impact of repressive policy on the order of the Russian social domain manifests itself in three interrelated dimensions:

●      Normalization of repressive practices within society, which transforms violence and punishment into a routine and socially acceptable mechanism of regulation.

●      Erosion of horizontal social ties and interpersonal trust, accompanied by the reinforcement of loyalty to the state, where fear and dependence replace solidarity and civic reciprocity.

●      Legitimation of repression within collective identity, achieved through state-promoted narratives of “external threat” and “historical necessity” — including references to the Stalinist era as a symbol of “effective toughness” and state order.

Conclusions

At this stage, Russia’s domestic order appears relatively resilient. It rests primarily on the personal authority of Vladimir Putin, who has become the central source of legitimacy within the system. Yet it is not only about one individual. The system is sustained by a combination of coercive capacity, control over the information space, and carefully constructed narratives that generate a minimally sufficient level of “voluntary” consent. The vision of the “good life” defines what is considered normal and proper, gradually making authoritarian practices seem natural and morally justified. Loyalty is reinforced by two powerful emotions—pride and fear—reproduced through education, media, institutions, and public rituals.

The resilience of this model is grounded in the restriction of pluralism and the concentration of coercive resources within the country. The political system leaves little room for autonomous centers of influence and combines discipline with symbolic mobilization. This configuration enhances governability and enables the system to withstand both external and internal pressure.

The narrative of war plays a central role in this structure. It shapes political language, sets the agenda, and frames how events are interpreted. The logic of mobilization helps consolidate society, yet it also creates dependence on the continual reproduction of conflict. War becomes not merely an instrument of policy, but the framework within which political decisions are made.

At the same time, this model contains an inherent vulnerability: the excessive concentration of legitimacy in a single individual. Personalized power allows for rapid decision-making and internal discipline, but it also makes the system sensitive to succession issues and potential elite rivalries. In the short term, this strengthens stability; in the long term, it raises the question of whether authority can be institutionalized without losing control.

Within this system, strategic narratives are not decorative but foundational. They provide a sense of identity, justify personalized authority and repressive instruments, and integrate loyalty, control, and discipline into a coherent framework of meaning. It is through this architecture of meaning that the system maintains functionality, even under conditions of economic strain and international isolation.

Featured Image: JBouchez, CC BY-SA 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons

Stop Putin Poster: "Anti-war poster Stop Putin against his megalomania, with a cartoon from 2014 when Crimea was annexed by Russia". Image Credit: birkho, CC BY-SA 3.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0>, via Wikimedia Commons